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The 4M Way of Combating Violent Extremism: An Analysis*
Kumar Ramakrishna
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
This article puts forth a “4M Way” of dealing with the threat of violent Islamist extremism in
Southeast Asia. It argues that our narrative must be fundamentally more attractive to the target
audience than the competing vision of the violent extremists. The memes that constitute our
narrative in the social media space must be “stickier” than those of the violent extremists. The
personal credibility of our messenger in the eyes of the target audience should exceed that of
extremist ideologues vis-á-vis that same audience. The mechanisms that we employ to impart our
messages to the target audience must be more effective that those employed by the violent
extremists. Finally, we must ensure that the market receptivity of the target audience is promoted
—by coordinating whole-of-government policies such that activities within the counter-narrative
space are supported and not inadvertently undercut by policy and military missteps in the wider
operational space.
______________________________________________________________________________

On

December 29, 2017, a video surfaced on a website known to be associated with the
notorious Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS, called Khayr Wilayah Media. Eight minutes
long, the clip—in Arabic and English—features an interview in English with a suicide bomber
about to embark on a car bomb attack and footage of ISIS attacks in France and Middle Eastern
conflict zones as well as on festive celebrations in Western capitals such as Sydney and New
York City. In particular, the video includes a segment in which the known Singaporean ISIS
militant Megat Shahdan Abdul Samad—who first surfaced on social media in September 2017—
also known by the moniker Abu Uqayl, leads two other Southeast Asian–looking ISIS fighters,
most likely wanted Malaysian militants, in executing three kneeling Arab-looking prisoners by
gunshot at close range. Before carrying out the cold-blooded murders, Abu Uqayl addresses the
camera in English. He urges ISIS supporters to “slay the enemies of Allah wherever you can find
them,” insisting that “the fighting has just begun” and “we will never stop cutting off the heads
of every kuffar and murtadin until we cleanse the land of Islam from East Asia to the West of
Africa.” The shocking video clip garnered massive attention on social media, prompting the
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore to roundly condemn it and charging that it represents a
“desperate attack” by ISIS to drive a wedge between Muslim and non-Muslim Singaporeans. As
the Singaporean terrorism analyst Bilveer Singh points out, the video clip “reinforces the need to
be vigilant as the Islamic State remains an existential threat.” He calls it “a daring challenge to
states,” adding that “it is up to Southeast Asian governments to respond to ensure that the
terrorists do not succeed even once.”1
Kumar Ramakrishna is an associate professor, head of Policy Studies, and head of the National Security Studies
Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
From a presentation given in September 2018 at a conference of the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict
in Oxford, England, and originally published in slightly different form in Learning from Violent Extremist Attacks:
Behavioural Sciences Insights for Practitioners and Policymakers, ed. Majeed Khader, Neo Loo Seng, Jethro Tan,
Damien D. Cheong, and Jeffery Chin (Singapore: World Scientific Publishers, 2019), 163–174.
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The Five Key Challenges in the Counter-narrative Policy Space
This brings us to the five key challenges that practitioners and policymakers need to address in
dealing with the ongoing and rapidly evolving threat of violent Islamist extremism of the type
that animates ISIS and its ideological bedfellows in Southeast Asia and elsewhere:
•
•
•
•
•

Our overall strategic objective must be to ensure that our narrative is
fundamentally more attractive to the target audience than the competing vision of
the violent extremists.
The memes that constitute our narrative in the social media space or elsewhere
must be “stickier” than those of the violent extremists.
The personal credibility of our messenger in the eyes of the target audience
should exceed that of extremist ideologues vis-á-vis that same audience.
The mechanisms that we employ to impart our messages to the target audience
must be more effective that those employed by the violent extremists.
Policymakers need to ensure that the market receptivity of the target audience is
promoted, by coordinating whole-of-government policies such that activities
within the counter-narrative space are supported and not inadvertently undercut
by policy and military missteps in the wider operational space.

To meet these five challenges, this article proposes the adoption of what may be called the “4M”
strategy for countering violent extremism of the type that animates ISIS and its affiliates. This
strategy is teased out as part of the five responses described in the sections that follow.

Response One: The Strategic Objective—The Need for Memes That Are
“Stickier” Than Those of the ISIS Extremists
During the 2017 presidential hustings in Singapore, President Halimah Yacob attracted much
attention with an arresting slogan for her campaign: “Do good, do together.” Responding to
public criticism of the technically ungrammatical phrasing, she explained that she chose the
phrase because “it’s catchy, it’s easy to understand, easy for everyone to relate.”2 She was spot
on and made a profound point about slogans in general that have wider implications. At one
level, the advertising world has long understood the principle that the best slogans, or to use the
more technical term—memes—need not be grammatically correct, just memorable. Malcolm
Gladwell, author of the classic study The Tipping Point, recounts that in 1954, when the
American tobacco company Winston introduced filter-tip cigarettes, it marketed them with the
ungrammatical slogan “Winston tastes good like a cigarette should,” rather than “Winston tastes
good as a cigarette should.” He notes that within months, “on the strength of that catchy phrase,”
Winston outsold its major rivals and became the top cigarette brand in the country. Thus, an
effective meme must be colloquial and memorable to work—not necessarily grammatical.3
This point bears further analysis. In our modern, Internet-saturated world, there is a surfeit
of news—true and “fake”—competing for our attention through multiple channels: no longer just
television, radio, and print but increasingly online by way of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube,
Whatsapp, Telegram, and a myriad other social media applications on our increasingly
inexpensive and permanently wired-up smartphones and laptops. Gladwell thus argues that
whatever we are urged “to read and watch, we simply don’t remember.” This is why modern
actors—whether advertisers, political parties, governments, and even terrorist and insurgent
groups—must fight hard to achieve information dominance over a target audience. Only through
2
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such control can the actor attain the goal of all such quests: capturing the hearts and minds of the
constituency in question. Thus, the various memes that constitute a wider overall narrative must
be “catchy, easy to understand, easy for everyone to relate.” It is suggested here that “Four Ms”
help us grasp how an actor can employ such memes and the wider narratives they constitute to
attain the information dominance needed to decisively shape the hearts and minds of a target
audience: the message, the messenger, the mechanism, and market receptivity. The Four Ms are
certainly relevant to the domain of countering violent extremism (CVE).

Response Two: The Message
The first element of the 4M strategy is that the essential message encoded in the meme and wider
narrative must be “sticky.” That it is, it should be simple to grasp, attention-grabbing, and
memorable or, as Gladwell puts it, the “presentation and structuring of information” can “make a
big difference in how much of an impact” is made.4 Chip and Dan Heath have identified several
factors that make a message and its constituent memes sticky: First, simplicity—the content of
the message must be simple but profound so that it can be easily recalled.5 Think of the Nike
meme “Just Do It,” for example. Second, unexpectedness—the message must contain
counterintuitive elements that snare attention. “Naturally sticky ideas,” the Heaths observe, are
also “full of concrete images—ice-filled bathtubs, apples with razors—because our brains are
wired to remember concrete data.” Fourth, credibility—“sticky ideas,” the authors aver, need to
seem culturally authentic and believable to the target audience. Fifth, emotions—the message
must appeal viscerally to the audience. In this respect, the Indonesian CVE activist and
researcher Noor Huda Ismail’s documentaries that explore the impact of violent extremist
ideology on families that have been involved in the ISIS conflict in Syria are powerful because
they show the emotional cost of engagement with such extremist causes.6 Sixth and finally,
stories: the Heaths argue that target audiences are better able to recall messages embedded in
memorable stories.
To be sure, there are many moderate Muslim clerics in Southeast Asia who are capable of
spinning sticky messages that may be capable of competing effectively against the violent
ideological appeals of ISIS extremists. In village communities in West Java, for example, some
preachers are popular because their sticky messages, rather than engaging with cumbersome,
“broader social questions,” focus on “allegories and narrative accounts created out of daily
experience.” One observer recounts in this regard the impact of an itinerant cleric, “Kiai AlJauhari”:
I have often seen audiences transfixed by Al-Jauhari’s allegories and narrative accounts.
He transforms Islamic messages into narrations made up of highly recognizable material,
with no shortage of humour added to the mix. People are engrossed as he unfolds his
creations. I have frequently asked village and mosque officials why they engage Al-



This section is adapted from Kumar Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: The Power of the
Manichean Mindset (Singapore: Springer, 2015), 228–229. The 4M Way seeks to improve upon and refine the
author’s earlier Counter-Ideological Response (CIR) Model, discussed in idem, “Towards a Comprehensive
Approach to Combating Violent Extremist Ideology in the Digital Space: The Counter-Ideological Response (CIR)
Model,” in Combating Violent Extremism and Radicalization in the Digital Era, ed. Majeed Khader, Loo Seng Neo,
Gabriel Ong, Eunice Tan Mingyi, and Jeffery Chin (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2016), 260–282.
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Jauhari. . . . The most common answer is that he is able to hold people’s attention for
long periods of time. (emphasis mine)7
It may be argued further that in the age of the social media sound bite, it would be important for
attractive speakers like Kiai Al-Jauhari to be able to translate their entertaining homilies into
forms that would become readily digestible “snackable content” for busy, “bored at work”
consumers who prefer material that is “fast and fun, geared to spread via Facebook.”8 In short,
the intrinsic attractiveness of the message sticks in the minds of the audience long after the
messenger leaves.

Response Three: The Messenger
The messenger that purveys the message is also important. He or she must enjoy significant
personal credibility with the target audience. This commodity, the leading Allied propagandist in
World War Two and future Labor government minister in the 1960s Richard H. S. Crossman
observed, is all-important.9 Selecting credible interlocutors is very audience-specific, moreover.
Some Southeast Asian counterterrorism officials, for instance, concede that globally famous
progressive Muslim scholars are often dismissed by violent Islamist militants as working for the
government. Thus, while such scholars may be effective in communicating with the wider
community, former radicals may have relatively greater traction with the militant constituency.
For instance, in Malaysia, the former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) financier Wan Min Wan Mat has
proven to be an effective interlocutor in the wider counterextremism efforts of the Police Special
Branch. He and Nasir Abbas, the former JI senior operational leader in Indonesia, have played
similar roles.10 This is not a new idea either. During the 1950s, at the height of the British
colonial counterinsurgency campaign against the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), while
Government Information Services churned out publicity material to educate the public,
surrendered Chinese guerrillas were often employed as well to reach out to their former
comrades in the Malayan jungles to entice them to surrender, with considerable success. A good
example of this approach was the use made of the former CPM leader Lam Swee. His
Government Information Services booklet My Accusation provided an insider’s account of the
contradictions between CPM rhetoric and the harsh reality on the ground, causing much havoc
within Communist ranks.11 For current CVE efforts, therefore, it would appear that a judicious
mix of moderate religious scholars and carefully selected former radicals may be needed. The
messenger conveying the meme, in short, matters too.

Response Four: The Mechanism
The relative merits of CVE communication platforms such as the face-to-face, print, broadcast,
and online media have received scrutiny. Many views abound. For instance, in Indonesia,
Twitter has been exploited by “Net-savvy radicals” to “lobby for their causes.”12 The Jemaah
Ansharut Tauhid network, implicated in terrorism-related cases in the country, has also used
various “internet and social networking sites” and YouTube to put out content.13 More than a
quarter of the Indonesia’s 240 million people are on Facebook, “thanks in large part to cheap and
fast Internet-capable phones,” and young people are, unsurprisingly, being targeted for terrorist
recruitment through social media.14 The current Indonesian police chief, General Tito Karnavian,
has iterated that in his view, face-to-face contact is more important than the Internet in

4

New England Journal of Public Policy
socializing individuals into violent Islamist ideology and that the “final touch is the personal
touch.”15 The respected terrorism analyst Sidney Jones of the Institute of Policy Analysis of
Conflict in Jakarta agrees, pointing out that “although terrorists groups’ Internet use is growing,
they still do most of their recruiting face-to-face at traditional places such as prayer meetings.”16
Additionally, print media such as the 137-page comic I Found the Meaning of Jihad, chronicling
the well-known life story of Nasir Abbas,17 and well-received locally produced documentaries
such as Prison and Paradise—about the children of the JI perpetrators of the October 2002 Bali
bombings as well as their victims—have also proven to be quite impactful.18
Comparatively little attention, however, has been placed on the underlying principles that
should guide their employment. Two principles from the comparatively sophisticated and
successful British psychological warfare effort in World War Two stand out in this regard. First,
the art of propaganda is to conceal that you are actually engaging in it.19 Thus, whether one is
using online or offline communications platforms, one’s narrative must not come across to the
audience so blatantly as “propaganda.” National campaigns calling on the public to stand firm
against violent extremism are needed but the same memes should also be conveyed by “softer,”
indirect, nongovernmental means, such as blogs, podcasts, commentary, and talk shows
involving famous sports, media, and entertainment personalities. A second principle is captured
in the saying “Entertainment is a valuable narcotic for dulling the sensibilities of a propagandaconscious mind.”20 The British in 1950s Malaya understood this principle when they invested in
a strong Malayan Film Unit and Radio Malaya’s Community Listening Service featuring the
legendary Lee Dai Soh to enthrall rural and urban audiences with anti-Communist memes
integrated with music, drama, humorous sketches, and short films about the new lives of
reformed guerillas.21 It is thus telling that modern CVE analysts such as the Dutch-Somali
commentator Ayaan Hirsi Ali similarly call for the use of humor and satire to undercut violent
extremist appeals today.22 The satirical and funny British film Four Lions is one example of the
use of entertainment as a way to promote the anti-extremist meme among vulnerable but wary
audiences.23

Response Five: Market Receptivity
The effective absorption by an audience of memes and narratives is also influenced by situational
context: put another way, are the “consumers” in the target market receptive to your “products”?
In September 1949, British High Commissioner Henry Gurney’s amnesty for Malayan
Communists failed. But by August 1957, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Merdeka
Amnesty succeeded spectacularly in collapsing the CPM’s morale. Why? One of the key factors
was that in 1949 the public knew the government was not winning, but by Tunku’s time, it was
patently obvious that the Communists were utterly on the back foot. In other words, by late 1957,
the “market” in question: the demoralized, rapidly dwindling numbers of Communist guerrillas
in the Malayan jungle, starved of food and medicines and severely harassed by the Security
Forces, were ready to lay down arms and were actively looking for a way out. 24 Similarly, in
today’s CVE context, as long as the objective political and socioeconomic grievances that
underpin Muslim separatism in the southern Philippines continue to be relatively unaddressed,
we shall likely see more sieges like the standoff between ISIS-linked militants and the
Philippines military in Marawi City in Mindanao that lasted for five months from May to
October 2017 and resulted in the killing of more than a thousand people.25 It has long been
recognized that in the Mindanao context, sheer military force is not enough to resolve the issue
of violent extremist ideology. Instead, “poverty, illiteracy, bad governance, wide availability of
5
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loose firearms, and non-enforcement of the rule of law in southern Philippines created a fertile
ground for radicalization to take root.”26 In this respect, there is a consensus that the proposed
Bangsamoro Basic Law, “which provides a regional governance system [and] addresses both
major political and economic redistribution issues, and important religious and cultural identity
needs and grievances of contemporary Moros,” represents an “important step in insuring” the
Philippines against “the threat of ISIS.”27 Failure to deal with such underlying problems would
only “fuel the recruitment drives” of pro-ISIS militant groups in Mindanao.28 In terms of our
analysis in this article, the Marawi episode suggests that no number of counterextremist memes
and narratives is likely to resolve the situation in and of themselves. Memes and the wider
narratives they constitute are not magic bullets—they can work only if the “market” is receptive.

Conclusion
The Marawi example also reinforces the point that Southeast Asia, including Singapore today, is
being assailed by a concerted ISIS social media onslaught seeking to split our respective
multicultural social fabrics apart. This point is clearly driven home by the December 2017 Abu
Uqayl video mentioned at the start of this article. Thus, preserving national unity in globalized,
multicultural, multireligious Singapore in an increasingly inclement strategic environment—
witness the SG Secure meme “Not if, but When”—should be a no-brainer.29 Now more than
ever, therefore, positive national narratives and their constituent memes—no matter how
ungrammatical as long as they are sticky, remember—are very much needed to maintain social
and psychological resilience. Countering the violent extremist threat posed by ISIS and its
affiliates requires nothing less.
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